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Abstract
This paper develops a new model of market abuse detection in real time.
Market abuse is detected, as Minenna (2003) proposed, on the basis of prediction
intervals. The model structure is based on the discrete-time, extended market
model introduced by Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) to analyze the market
cleanliness. Parameters of the expected return equation are assumed, however,
to be time-varying and estimated under the state-space framework using the
extended Kalman ﬁlter postulated by Chou, Engle, Kane (1992) to capture
the GARCH eﬀect in returns. QML estimation is performed on intraday data;
its utilization is proposed as an alternative to the continuous time modeling
by Minenna (2003). This framework is generalized to the bivariate case which
enables the analysis of daily open/close data. The paper also extends procedures
of the statistical veriﬁcation of the estimated state-space model to include the
uncertainty arising from time-invariant parameters.
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1 Introduction
The issue of market abuse detection goes back at least to 1930s when US legal system
prohibited insider trading, i.e. securities trading motivated by publicly unavailable,
price-sensitive information (Meulbroek 1992). The term ‘market abuse’ refers, how-
ever, to a much broader scope of activities than insider trading exlusively, including
in particular various forms of market manipulation. Market manipulation may be de-
ﬁned as distorting the price-setting mechanism of ﬁnancial instruments (trade-based
manipulation) or as disseminating false or misleading information (information-based
manipulation). Such a ‘broad’ understanding of market abuse has been adopted by
the legal system of the European Union. The deﬁnition of market abuse may be ex-
tended further to include e.g. brokerage frauds like ‘front-running’ (taking advantage
of advance knowledge of pending orders).
The econometric literature has considered detection of market abuse, however, only
since the early 1990’s (e.g. Mitchell, Netter 1994). Financial econometrics, which has
focused on insider trading, proposed a framework to identify the latter on the basis
of security returns. A case of market abuse may be thus considered as an abnormal
event, whose probability under standard market conditions is less than the signiﬁ-
cance level. The methodology to identify such events had been proposed much earlier
by event studies. The problem, however, with the application of the event studies
methodology is that it is ex post approach, which enables to detect market abuse
cases regarding the past rather than the present. Moreover, an attempt to apply the
event study methodology directly to the issue of market abuse puts too much empha-
sis on looking for a statistical ‘proof’ of the abuse, which is already suspected.
So far, only a handful of attempts have been made to develop the real-time fraud de-
tection model as well as to utilize more data than the rates of return solely. Minenna
(2003) proposed the continuous time model to detect market abuse on real-time ba-
sis. The model analyzes return rates, volumes and market structure characteristics
(concentration measures), but relies on daily closing data only. The continuous time
framework is intended to extrapolate closing values through to the entire next session.
Such an approach might be justiﬁed when the only available data were the closing
values. If it is not the case, the introduction (not necessarily trivial) of a continu-
ous time model could be exchanged for the utilisation of intraday data. Moreover,
the continuous time framework imposes some simplifying limitations on the model
structure. That is particularly relevant in the Minenna’s (2003) paper – there are no
exogenous variables while all endogenous variables are assumed to follow an AR(1)
process.
Another attempt to utilize data from more sources was made by Dubow and Monteiro
(2006) who used a standard CAPM-like market model to measure market cleanliness.
Abnormal events (in terms of security returns) are identiﬁed on the ‘benchmark’ ba-
sis, referring to the exogenous market performance. The same framework is applied
to analyse trading volumes. The analysis, however, is conducted on ex post basis
under the classical event study approach. Moreover, the model structure, though ex-
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tended byMonteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) to capture both autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity eﬀects, may be still too restrictive to track the market evolution.
This issue is of a particular importance in the case of emerging markets of CEE
economies, although it has been not intensively discussed in the literature on the
fraud detection models so far.
The aim of this paper is to develop a model that will both allow for a fraud detec-
tion on real-time basis and possibly closely replicate the evolving market structure.
The latter requires a time-varying parameter model whilst the former requires intra-
day data as the model input. This framework may be generalized to analyze daily
open/close data which is of a particular importance in identifying some manipulation
cases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the model framework, includ-
ing procedures to identify market abuse, is developed in Section 2. Estimation and
statistical inference issues are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents some empir-
ical results of the model’s application to the Warsaw Stock Exchange and discusses
model’s ability to detect market abuse using the example of insider trading. Section
5 concludes.
2 Econometric framework
The basis for further analysis is the model proposed by Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf
(2007) to identify insider trading. The following model is an extension of the standard
CAPM-like market model (see e.g. Alexander 2001) allowing for autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity in security returns:
Rt =  + Rmt + Rt 1 + 
Rm;t 1 + "t; "t  NID(0;2
t) (1)
2
t = !0 + !1"2
t 1 + !22
t 1; (2)
where Rt stands for the return on a given security between two subsequent closings,
t and t   1, and Rmt is the return on the market portfolio in the same period. 2
t
denotes the conditional variance of the Gaussian white-noise error term "t. The con-
ditional variance evolves according to a simple GARCH(1,1) equation.
The diﬀerence between the actual return, Rt, and its conditional expectation,  +
Rmt + Rt 1 + 
Rm;t 1, deﬁnes the abnormal return. Following the event study
methodology, Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) identify insider trading when the
average abnormal returns both around the day of information release (‘announce-
ment’) and in the days preceding the information release (‘pre-announcement period’)
are statistically signiﬁcant as well as of the same sign. The approach by Monteiro,
Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) has, however, some disadvantages. Firstly, the event study
methodology makes use of ex post analysis with prior knowledge about the moments
of potential frauds (‘announcements’). Thus, the econometrics is employed here to
yield a kind of a ‘statistical proof’ of a suspected abuse, not to detect the abuse.
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Secondly, this methodology can be applied to the detection of insider trading solely,
as there is no prior knowledge of the timing of other frauds, like ‘announcements’ in
the case of insider trading.
It may be worth stressing that although the above model captures both heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation, Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) consider these two
issues as phenomena that are of statistical rather than economic nature. This may be
partially justiﬁed in the case of heteroskedasticity, since in the GARCH framework
the realized volatility is mostly approximated as squared returns. As a consequence,
the volatility analysis becomes equivalent to the return analysis. That is not the
case of autocorrelation, which should not be present at all under the weak eﬃcient
market hypothesis. Autocorrelated security returns indicate a distortion of the mar-
ket eﬃciency, which might be associated with some market abuse activities (mainly
trade-based manipulation) unless the market had been ineﬃcient prior to the study.
Thus, autocorrelation analysis may oﬀer a great deal of information for market abuse
investigations.
Minenna (2003) proposed real-time fraud detection based on the predicted return
intervals as an alternative to ex post analysis. Given Rt as the return on a given
security, an alert about the possible market abuse would be generated once Rt fell
outside the interval:
[ ^ Rtjt 1   z=2  ^  ^ Rtjt 1; ^ Rtjt 1 + z1 =2  ^  ^ Rtjt 1]; (3)
where ^ Rtjt 1 is the forecast of Rt based on the data available up to t   1, ^  ^ Rtjt 1 is
the RMSE of that forecast and z=2;z1 =2 stand for the quantiles of the error term
distribution of order =2 and 1   =2 respectively.
The forecast of Rt is computed on the basis of some reference model, which needs to be
adapted to the continuous-time framework. Minenna (2003) develops a continuous-
time model for the security price which is estimated from daily closing data. Un-
der the continuous-time framework, the model structure has to remain, however,
relatively simple (in Minenna’s model security prices are driven exclusively by the
one-dimensional Wiener process). Such an approach could be advocated if the only
available data were closing prices; when it is not the case a reasonable alternative is
to use a less sophisticated (i.e. discrete-time) model and more (i.e. intraday) data.
The above alternative might be criticized, since intraday data indicates speciﬁc sta-
tistical features, as the autocorrelation in returns and in squared returns. The usually
low though signiﬁcant autocorrelation of low order may result from market microstruc-
ture eﬀects, like bid-ask spreads, while higher-order autocorrelation may be associated
with the well-known intraday periodicity phenomena (see Alexander 2001 for a review
of stylized facts concerning intraday returns). The autocorrelation in squared returns
happens in turn to be quite high and decays at a very slow pace, which suggests a
higher-order GARCH should be employed. If these features are, however, common
for all assets at the given market, then they could be implicitly incorporated into the
reference model by including the market portfolio return as the explanatory variable.
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Such a solution calls for the application of the model by Monteiro, Zaman, Leitter-
storf (2007), which in addition captures the autocorrelation in returns. Under such
a framework, the random term corresponds to abnormal returns rather than to ‘raw’
returns, and its intraday properties do not have to replicate those of ‘raw’ returns. In
particular, if the higher-order autocorrelation of squared returns on individual assets
might be explained by the analogous pattern of market portfolio squared returns (so
it is common for all assets), then the variance structure of the random term (speciﬁc
for a given asset) might evolve according to a GARCH process of a lower order. For
simplicity, the GARCH(1,1) structure will be further assumed. This presumption
needs obviously an empirical conﬁrmation. Moreover, intraday data should be still
adjusted in terms of time and volatility units, which is rather a technical issue, see
e.g. Engle (2000).
The problem with the model of Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007) arises when
computing one-period-ahead return forecasts in real time. The return on market
portfolio is known at the same time as the returns on individual assets. Thus, the
one-period-ahead return forecast cannot be computed ex ante and becomes avail-
able only when the actual return is observed. In the real-time framework based on
prediction intervals it is however the diﬀerence between the actual return and its fore-
cast which is necessitated to identify the abnormal return. This diﬀerence becomes
known only after the actual return is observed, regardless the model consists of ex-
ogenous variables or not. Under the continuous time framework by Minnena (2003)
this diﬀerence is calculated on a permanent (real-time) basis. Under the discrete time
framework, which is postulated here, this diﬀerence can be calculated on an interval
basis, depending on the choice of the time unit. The shorter the intervals, the more
this approach resembles the continuous time framework. Owing to that fact, and since
asset returns are real-time data, which is accessible immediately after the asset price
is set, this approach will be still referred to as the real-time analysis. The maximum
delay between potential market abuse and its discovery under such a framework will
be bounded by the chosen time interval.
Utilizing intraday data should not, however, imply equally weighting all data points.
In many ﬁnancial markets, especially in the stock exchange, trading does not oper-
ate on a fully continuous basis. Discontinuous trading requires separate handling of
opening and closing prices. Opening prices reﬂect all orders placed after the preced-
ing closing while ‘regular’ intraday prices usually correspond to single orders. Closing
prices are often determined during the ﬁxing through an algorithm imitating the Wal-
rasian auctioneer, which distinguishes them from ordinary market prices.
Separate handling of opening and closing data can be done relatively easily by a
generalization of the model (1) – (2):
R0;t = 0 + 0R0;mt + 0R1;t 1 + 
0R0;m;t 1 + "0;t (4)
R1;t = 1 + 1R1;mt + 1R0;t + 
1R1;mt + "1;t (5)
"t = ["0;t "1;t]0  N(0;Ht); (6)
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where R0;t, R0;mt denote the returns between the opening on day t and the preceding
closing on the given security and on the market portfolio respectively. R1;t and R1;mt
stand for the returns between the closing and the opening on day t on the security
and the market portfolio respectively. Ht denotes the variance-covariance matrix of
"t which evolves according to a multivariate GARCH process of the general VECH
form:
vech(Ht) = C + Avech("t 1"0
t 1) + Bvech(Ht 1): (7)
Although index t refers to diﬀerent time units depending whether the model for intra-
day or open/close data is used, it will be left unchanged to avoid further complications
of already complicated notation.
The original model of Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007), which is postulated here
to analyze intraday data and then extended for opening and closing data, is estimated
under two restrictive assumptions. Firstly, one has to assume the error term follows
the Gaussian distribution, which is clearly not what is observed on ﬁnancial markets.
The model estimates would still be unbiased and consistent even if the underlying
distribution was not Gaussian (the variance-covariance matrix of estimates needs,
however, to be adjusted for the non-normality of the error term distribution). In the
later part of the text no particular distribution of the error term will be assumed
and only the ﬁrst and the second central moment will be speciﬁed; this approach is
commonly referred to as semi-parametric (see e.g. Engle 2000). Under that approach
a problem arises when testing for the signiﬁcance of abnormal returns, which are not
Gaussian. That may be however solved easily using the well-established bootstrap-
ping techniques, see e.g. Efron (1987). Secondly, the model parameters are assumed
to be constant over the time. Numerous studies of CEE capital markets (Emerson,
Hall, Zalewska-Mitura 1997; Zalewska, Hall 1999; Rockinger, Urga 2000; Worthing-
ton, Higgs 2003) show this assumption does not hold. Models that do not capture
the market evolution may misidentify abnormal returns.
Therefore, parameters of models (1) – (2) and (4) – (7) should be treated as the
realization of a stochastic process. Most research up to date (e.g. Chou, Engle, Kane
1992; Zalewska, Hall 1999; Rockinger, Urga 2000) suggest the random walk process
as a plausible way to incorporate the time variation in model parameters:
t = t 1 + t; t  D(0;2
); (8)
where t represents any structural parameter of those models and t denotes the
innovation to the process, which is independently distributed with a zero mean and
variance 2
. The capital letter D denotes some probability distribution. In the limit
case when 2
 ! 0, the parameter t becomes constant for all t;t = 1;:::;T. Note
that parameters of GARCH equations (2) and (7) remain intact. Then, the complete
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model can be rewritten as:
Rt = t + tRmt + tRt 1 + 
tRm;t 1 + "t; "t  D(0;2
t) (9)
t = t 1 + t;t  D(0;2
);  2 f;;;
g (10)
2
t = !0 + !1"2
t 1 + !22
t 1 (11)
in the case of intraday data, and:
R0;t = 0 + 0R0;mt + 0R1;t 1 + 
0R0;m;t 1 + "0;t (12)
R1;t = 1 + 1R1;mt + 1R0;t + 
1R1;mt + "1;t (13)
t = t 1 + t;t  D(0;2
);  2 f0;0;0;
0;1;1;1;
1g (14)
"t = ["0;t "1;t]0  D(0;Ht) (15)
vech(Ht) = C + Avech("t 1"0
t 1) + Bvech(Ht 1) (16)
in the case of open/close data. The MSE for one-step-ahead forecasts of Rt and
R0;t;R1;t should be then used to standardize residuals and ﬁnd (through resampling)
the estimates of error term distribution quantiles which are necessary for the construc-
tion of prediction intervals. Similarly, MSE of estimates of t and 0;t;1;t enables to
test (using a simple t-statistic) the signiﬁcance of autocorrelation in security returns.
The next section discusses the estimation of above models and the computation of
MSE’s.
3 Model structure and estimation
The model developed in the previous section, both in the uni- and bivariate case, may
be estimated using the Kalman ﬁlter with some extension to capture the GARCH
eﬀect in disturbances (Chou, Engle, Kane 1992). Kalman ﬁltering requires the model
to be expressed in a state-space form (the following notation is based on Hamilton
1994):
t+1 = F(xt)t + ut+1 (17)
yt = a(xt) + [Z(xt)]0t + vt; (18)
where t denotes r  1 vector of state variables (time-varying parameters), yt –
n  1 vector of endogenous variables (security returns) and xt – k  1 vector of
exogenous or predetermined variables respectively (market portfolio returns, lagged
security and market portfolio returns). Matrices F(xt) and Z(xt) as well as vector
a(xt) of dimension rr, rn and n1 respectively are functions of vector xt. Vectors
of disturbances to both transition (17) and observation (18) equation are denoted by
ut+1 and vt, with dimensions r  1 and n  1 respectively.
In the univariate case of intraday data (n = 1), vector yt is reduced to scalar Rt
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and matrix Z(xt) equals simply xt = [1 Rmt Rt 1 Rm;t 1]0 provided all structural
parameters are time-varying (r = 4). Otherwise, Z(xt) is extracted from xt by
taking those terms, for which structural parameters are time-varying. Function a(xt)
is deﬁned as a sum of products of the time-invariant structural parameters and the
corresponding terms from xt. If r = 4, a(xt) simpliﬁes to zero. Random vector vt
simpliﬁes in the univariate case to the error term, "t.
In the bivariate case of open/close data (n = 2), vector yt equals [R0;t R1;t]0 while
Z(xt) is the following matrix:

1 R0;mt R1;t 1 R1;m;t 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 R1;mt R0;t R0;mt
0
;
unless some structural parameters are constant. If so, Z(xt) is extracted from (3) by
taking those rows of that matrix, for which structural parameters are time-varying.
Function a(xt) is deﬁned per analogiam as a sum of products of the time-invariant
structural parameters and the corresponding elements of (3). If there are no time-
invariant parameters, function a(xt) is simply zero. Random vector vt in the bivariate
case is equivalent to ["0;t "1;t].
In both cases of intraday and open/close data, the random walk structure of (8)
implies F is the r  r identity matrix:
F = I: (19)
Under the textbook approach, both random vectors ut+1 and vt of dimensions r 1
and n1 are normally distributed conditional on the data available in the preceding
period, It 1 = fyt 1;xt 1;:::;y1;x1g, and the current value of xt. Under the semi-
parametric approach proposed in this paper the analytical form of the probability
distribution function is not speciﬁed explicitly whilst the parameters of the distri-



















where matrices Q(xt) and H(xt) of dimension r  r and n  n respectively are both
functions of xt.
Matrix H(xt) represents the conditional variance-covariance matrix of the distur-
bances in the observation equation (18) which under the GARCH framework de-
pends on the past disturbances rather than xt. In the univariate case H(xt) equals
simply 2
t. In the bivariate case it will be referred to shortly as H. Q(xt) is the
variance-covariance matrix of disturbances in the transition equation (innovations to
time-varying parameters) which is constant over the time, Q(xt)  Q. Provided
disturbances are independent, Q is diagonal.
Standard Kalman ﬁlter algorithm, see e.g. equations 13.8.6 – 13.8.9 in Hamilton
(1994), may be then applied do obtain estimates of unknown time-varying parame-
ters 1;:::;T. This algorithm, however, does not conform with the GARCH eﬀect
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in disturbances in the observation equation. Chou et al. (1992) proposed therefore to
extend the standard Kalman ﬁlter algorithm by a slightly modiﬁed GARCH equation:
2
t = !0 + !1e2
t 1 + !22
t 1; (21)
where the lagged error term "t 1 was replaced by the lagged residual et 1. Under the
Kalman ﬁlter framework, this residual denoted by ^ vtjt 1 is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between the one-step-ahead forecast of yt and its actual value. Although the analysis
by Chou et al. (1993) considers the univariate model, the obvious generalization
would handle the bivariate case as well:
vech(Ht) = C + Avech(et 1e0
t 1) + Bvech(Ht); (22)
where et 1 denotes the two-dimensional counterpart of et 1.
Equation (22) involves, however, 21 parameters to be estimated. A more parsimo-
nious parametrization would be the diagonal VECH model with 9 unknowns (see e.g.
Alexander 2001); this model unfortunately does not guarantee the variance-covariance
matrix to be both positive-deﬁnite and stationary. These two restrictions may be im-
posed with the BEKK model by Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (1995) which extends
the number of parameters to 11. The latter may be decreased to 7 if the model is
estimated in the reduced, diagonal form, which may be somehow restrictive.
In the author’s opinion, a plausible solution to the trade-oﬀ between the ﬂexibility
of the model structure and the parsimony of the parametrization is the CCC (con-
stant conditional correlation) model, restricting the conditional correlation between




0;t %  0;t1;t

























where A;B;C are here 2  1 vectors.  denotes element-by-element multiplication.
Matrix Ht is positive-deﬁnite for all % 2 [ 1;1] if only 2
0; 6= 2
1;. To ensure
the variance-covariance matrix to be stationary one has only to check whether the
following inequality holds:
A + B  1: (25)
If % is not statistically signiﬁcant and set to zero, the CCC model becomes equivalent
to the two simultaneously estimated GARCH processes.
The Kalman ﬁlter assumes all time-invariant parameters of the state-space model to
be known. As this is here not the case, those are estimated through the numerical
269 Radosław Cholewiński
CEJEME 1: 261-284 (2009)Radosław Cholewiński




















Filter residuals are denoted here according to the general notation of the state-space
model by ^ vt. Of course, ^ vt simpliﬁes to et in the case of intraday data and is equiv-
alent to et for open/close data. Wt denotes the MSE of the one-step-ahead forecast
of yt.
The likelihood function is then maximized numerically with respect to . If both ran-
dom vectors ut+1 and vt were conditionally normal, the estimated vector of model
parameters would follow a normal distribution as well. Watson (1989) shows that
under some general conditions this distribution is asymptotically normal even if the
underlying distribution of disturbances is not Gaussian. This semi-parametric esti-
mation method is known as Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML). Collect all unknown
model parameters in  and denote its estimate by ^ , then:
p



































Sums on the RHS of equations (29) – (30) can be interpreted as the Hessian of ` with
respect to  and its approximation by the outer product of gradients respectively. It
follows from (28):






Standard errors of individual elements of ^  are computed as square-roots of diagonal
elements of V(^ ). Their signiﬁcance may be tested with a simple t-statistic. Since
the limit distribution of ^  is Gaussian, the test statistic follows a t distribution with
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T   k degrees of freedom in the limit, where k is the length of . For large T the
distribution of ^  converges to the normal distribution.
Note, however, that under both non-Gaussian disturbances and time-varying param-
eters, Kalman ﬁlter becomes suboptimal in terms of MSE associated with the one-
step-ahead forecast of yt. Most research on the Kalman ﬁlter application to ﬁnancial
market models has paid no particular attention to that issue, which may be explained
by the fact there is no general alternative to estimate such models.
Having the above model estimated, one still has to compute the MSE associated both
with estimates of state variables and one-step-ahead forecast of yt, which is crucial
for identifying both signiﬁcant autocorrelation and abnormal returns. Standard for-
mulas for the MSE of the estimate of t based on It 1, ^ tjt 1, and the forecast of yt
conditional on It 1 and xt, ^ ytjt 1, do not account for uncertainty of model parame-
ters, which are assumed to be known in the basic Kalman ﬁlter framework. Hamilton
(1986) proposed to decompose the MSE of ^ , denoted by Ptjt 1(^ ) in two parts: one,
that would be present if the model parameters were known with certainty, Ptjt 1,
which is just the standard Kalman ﬁlter MSE of ^ tjt 1, and the other, which is due
to the uncertainty in . Hamilton (1986) proves that:
Ptjs(^ ) = Ptjs() + Ef[^ tjs()   ^ tjs(^ )][^ tjs()   ^ tjs(^ )]0g: (34)
The second element of the above sum may be evaluated by the Monte-Carlo integra-
tion, see Hamilton (1986), (1994) for details. Then, the signiﬁcance of any element of
t can be tested by the t-statistic.
To the author’s knowledge, economic literature has so far ignored the need to adjust
the MSE of ^ ytjt 1, henceforth Wt, for the uncertainty of . That can be done in a
following way. It follows from the deﬁnition of Wt that:
Ef[yt   ^ ytjt 1][yt   ^ ytjt 1]0g = Ef[xt(a   ^ a) + xt(t   ^ tjt 1) + ut]g
 [xt(a   ^ a) + xt(t   ^ tjt 1) + ut]0g = xtEf[a   ^ a][a   ^ a]
0gx0
t+
xtEf[t   ^ tjt 1][t   ^ tjt 1]0gx0
t + xtEf[a   ^ a][t   ^ tjt 1]0gx0
t+




t + xtPtjt 1(^ )x0
t + xtGt(^ )x0
t + Ht: (35)
V(^ CP) stands for the MSE of time-invariant paramaters entering the observation
equation (18), which is constructed by selecting the corresponding rows and columns
from the V(^ ) matrix. Ptjt 1(^ ) is given by (34) and Gt(^ ) is deﬁned as:
Gt(^ ) = Kt(^ ) + [Kt(^ )]0 (36)
Kt(^ ) = Ef[a   ^ a][t   ^ tjt 1]0g: (37)
Unknown matrix Kt(^ ) may be estimated together with Ptjt 1(^ ) by the Monte-
Carlo integration, which should save some time on computations. The MSE of ^ ytjt 1
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is then used to standardize ﬁlter residuals which are subsequently bootstrapped to
identify abnormal ones.
4 Empirical results
The models given by equations (9) – (11) and (12) – (16) were estimated for three
stocks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. These stocks were selected on the
following criteria:
 previously disclosed manipulation cases,
 high intensity of insiders’ trading (not to be confused with insider trading),
 mergers and acquisitions, which are often accompanied by informed dealing of
securities.
The individual securities will be named in the remainder of the text as A, B and C
(detailed information on them is available from the author upon request). Data on his-
torical quotes (daily as well as intraday) of these securities is available inter alia on the
website of ‘Parkiet’, the popular Polish ﬁnancial daily (http:\\www.parkiet.com).
Intraday data comprises hourly quotes from 1st June 2006 to 31st January 2007; this
period was chosen according to the data availability and the comparability of data
for individual stocks. The hourly frequency is a result of balancing between possibly
short intervals between data points and minimization of data points with no trades
(zero returns). For each trading day there are seven observations from 10:00 to 16:00
(totally 1183 observations).
Data on opening (9:30) and closing prices (16:20) prices covers the period from the
2nd January 2006 to 31st August 2008 (667 trading days). Similarly to the case of
intraday data, this period was chosen due to the availability and the comparability
of data.
Both models for intraday and open/closing data were estimated numerically in the R
environment using the Fortran-based algorithm of Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno
(L-BFGS-B). This algorithm enables to impose linear restrictions on parameters,
which may be necessary to ensure the stationarity with respect to the GARCH process.
Initial values for GARCH processes were set by ﬁtting univariate GARCH processes
to residuals from OLS regressions of individual observation equations. Estimates of
these regressions were used as initial values for time-invariant parameters. Initial val-
ues for Q were set to the variances of time-varying parameters (in ﬁrst diﬀerences)
coming from rolling regressions of individual observation equations. Matrix Q was
factorized on the basis of Cholesky decomposition in order to accelerate the computa-
tions and to ensure the estimated matrix is positive deﬁnite (Hamilton 1994). Since
Q is diagonal, variance estimates are simply squares of corresponding elements of the
estimated Cholesky matrix.
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Tables 1 – 2 present estimation results. In the case of intraday data, for each secu-
rity at least one parameter of the observation equation was not signiﬁcant at 0.10
level regardless of whether it was set to be time-varying or time-invariant. Among
other parameters of the observation equation at least one was time-varying. An error
made when applying the constant parameter model to detect market abuse events
may be, as evidence suggests, substantial. For all securities, the variance of "t was
heteroskedastic, though its persistence varied among securities.
Table 1: Estimation results for intraday data. Standard errors are given in parenthe-
ses, t statistics in square brackets and p-values in braces, sqrt() denotes the algebraic














































Interestingly, both residuals and squared residuals from the intraday model were al-
most uncorrelated at any order, although the input data showed substantial higher-
order autocorrelation with respect to both 1-hour returns and squared 1-hour returns.
Only in the case of C there were indices of some autocorrelation in squared residuals,
though on the frontier of statistical signiﬁcance. The presumption that the inclusion
of the market portfolio return into the reference model should extract the speciﬁc
features of intraday data, justifying the simple GARCH(1,1) variance structure of the
random term, appears to be correct.
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Table 2: Estimation results for open/close data. Standard errors are given in paren-
theses, t statistics in square brackets and p-values in braces, sqrt() denotes the al-
gebraic square root. Italics placed for sqrt() indicate estimates of time-invariant
parameters. Lower-case indexed letters a;b;c stand for the corresponding elements of
A;B;C.









(0.0752) (0.0357) (0.0963) (0.0143)
[2.5934] [2.5706] [-1.6908] [2.1588]









(0.0239) (0.0165) (0.0151) (0.0176) (0.0148) (0.0893)
[1.9163] [-4.1901] [1.6244] [1.6799] [2.3017] [6.3683]









(0.0013) (0.0944) (0.0699) (0.0099)
[1.9184] [-6.1582] [-4.8501] [3.1888]











(0.0708) (0.0572) (0.0577) (0.1872) (0.2322) (0.0075)
[2.6958] [3.0255] [3.0274] [2.416] [3.1911] [2.8582]





(0.1179) (2.0984) (0.1175) (1.1041) (1.8749) (0.3347)
[2.0836] [2.2719] [0.6775] [0.4609] [1.5825] [0.7888]





(0.0214) (0.4934) (0.0642) (0.1465) (0.0325) (0.0640)
[1.3246] [1.1507] [1.0424] [0.8786] [2.3907] [1.2214]





(0.0431) (0.2396) (0.1202) (0.2891) (0.0904) (0.1201)
[20.5172] [1.0112] [7.3927] [2.7814] [8.8843] [7.2907]
{0.0000} {0.3119} {0.0000} {0.0054} {0.0000} {0.0000}
In the case of open/close data, from ﬁve up to eight parameters in the observation
equation were statistically signiﬁcant at 0.10 level; about the half of them were time-
varying. In particular, the coeﬃcients associated with the return on the market
portfolio changed (with one exception) over time. Graphs 1 – 7 provide the trajectories
of time-varying coeﬃcients. The structure of the GARCH process diﬀered between
securities in terms of both signiﬁcance and persistence; in no case, however, was the
conditional correlation signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
The estimated models were used to generate alerts about possible market abuse events.
An alert about abnormal returns was generated each time the realized return rate fell
outside the 95%-conﬁdence interval for the one-step-ahead forecast, while an alert
about signiﬁcant autocorrelation was generated each time when the t-ratio exceeded
1.64 in absolute terms which corresponds to the p-value of 10%. In the case of intraday
data, the number of abnormal returns for all securities slightly exceeded 5%, which
would be implied by the signiﬁcance level. Statistically signiﬁcant autocorrelation was
discovered only in returns of B; it lasted for about 2/3 of the sample length. That
may be attributed to some manipulation practices like generating buy or sell signals
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of technical analysis (such a case came to light shortly thereafter).
Figure 1: Estimates of time-varying parameters – intraday data of A.
Figure 2: Estimates of time-varying parameters – intraday data of B.
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Figure 3: Estimates of time-varying parameters – intraday data of C.
Figure 4: Estimates of time-varying parameters – open/close data of C.
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Figure 5: Estimates of time-varying parameters – open/close data of A.
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Figure 6: Estimates of time-varying parameters – open/close data of B.
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Figure 7: Estimates of time-varying parameters – open/close data of C (cont.).
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To avoid the sample bias, the results were compared with those of the model reesti-
mated on the ﬁrst half of the sample, with no change in the model structure. The
comparison yields a mixed picture. Whilst for one security (B) the performance of the
full-sample model was superior to the half-sample model (more alerts were generated
in both parts of the sample), for others the opposite held or the performance was
similar. Details on that comparison are presented in Table 3.
In the case of open/close data, the number of abnormal returns for all stocks exceeded
Table 3: Alerts generated by the model for intraday data. ‘Missing alerts’ refer to
those generated by one model and not generated by the other model.
Number of alerts Model estimated on
in a half-sample half sample full sample
Stock A 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns 30 38 68 25 33 58
Autocorrelation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing
Returns 1 0 1 6 5 11
Autocorrelation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stock B 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns 30 22 52 37 25 62
Autocorrelation 0 464 464 0 533 533
Missing
Returns 8 5 13 1 2 3
Autocorrelation 0 69 69 0 0 0
Stock C 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns 29 16 45 39 21 60
Autocorrelation 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing
Returns 10 5 15 0 0 0
Autocorrelation 0 0 0 0 0 0
10% level implied by the 5% signiﬁcance level and the doubled number of endogenous
variables. For B abnormal returns on the opening were dominant, which may indicate
the marking-the-close manipulation. For C, the relation between abnormal returns
on the closing and on the opening was balanced, whilst in the case of A abnormal
returns on the closing dominated over those on the opening. Moreover, there was
evidence of time-varying, signiﬁcant autocorrelation in returns of C, otherwise absent
in intraday data (note that open/close data covers the entire period when intraday
data was available). Time-varying autocorrelation in returns of A, which was present
in the intraday data, disappeared in the open/close data analysis.
Similarly to the case of intraday data, the model for open/close data was reestimated
on the ﬁrst half of the sample. Contrary to the intraday data case, models estimated
on the half sample generated more alerts in both parts of the sample, which indicates
some overﬁt of the full-sample model. See Table 4 for details.
Abnormal return alerts may be applied in a straightforward manner to detect in-
sider trading. While alerts following price-sensitive information releases just conﬁrm
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Table 4: Alerts generated by the model for open (Op)/close (Cl) data. ‘Missing alerts’
refer to those generated by one model and not generated by the other model.
Number of alerts Model estimated on
in a half-sample half sample full sample
Stock A 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns Op 19 18 37 18 17 35
Returns Cl 21 36 57 15 21 36
Autocorrelation Op 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation Cl 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing
Returns Op 1 0 1 2 1 3
Returns Cl 1 0 1 7 15 22
Autocorrelation O 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation C 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stock B 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns Op 20 17 37 21 13 34
Returns Cl 19 16 35 18 15 33
Autocorrelation Op 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation Cl 0 0 0 0 0 0
Missing
Returns Op 7 3 10 6 7 13
Returns Cl 4 1 5 5 2 7
Autocorrelation Op 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation Cl 0 0 0 0 0 0
Stock C 1st 2nd Total 1st 2nd Total
Generated
Returns Op 21 13 34 24 13 37
Returns Cl 16 25 41 17 18 35
Autocorrelation Op 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation Cl 240 300 540 214 307 521
Missing
Returns Op 4 2 6 1 2 3
Returns Cl 4 1 5 3 8 11
Autocorrelation Op 0 0 0 0 0 0
Autocorrelation Cl 10 7 17 36 0 36
the information was in fact price-sensitive, alerts preceding information releases may
indicate some informed dealing. In order to check whether generated alerts identify
moments of possible insider trading, the alerts were compared with the list of all news
releases by the company and on the company whose stock may be subject to market
abuse (the list was prepared with the use of the information service of the Warsaw
Stock Exchange GPW Infostrefa). Information is assumed to be reﬂected in the stock
price no later than on the next trading day after the disclosure. If the alert precedes
the information by ﬁve trading days or less, insider trading may be suspected. That
interval is chosen in line with the ﬁndings of Dubow and Monteiro (2006) and Mon-
teiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007). Note, however, that informed dealing may take
place in much greater advance, in particular in the case of mergers and acquisitions,
which may be planned long time before any kind of information is released.
For intraday data on A and C stock prices, about 90% of all abnormal return alerts
could be attributed to the information released around the alert. In the case of B,
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this ratio amounted only to 40%, since the total number of news releases (16 in the
8 months’ sample) was much smaller. More than half of alerts preceded information,
which suggests a large intensity of insider trading (see tab. 3). A more detailed
analysis of news releases associated with alerts revealed some interesting facts:
 A member of the executive board of company A traded its stocks in the period
preceding the publication of the company’s ﬁnancial results. This was accom-
panied by abnormal returns.
 The considered period coincides with a takeover by company C – relevant news
releases were almost always preceded by an alert.
 An investor systematically traded shares of B, each time crossing the 5% level
which according to the law obliged him to disclose the transaction. When the
purchase was disclosed, the investor sold stocks, and when the sale was disclosed,
he bought the stocks. This practice was revealed later on by the stock market
supervision.
In the case of open/close data, some 65% (B) to 80% (A) abnormal return alerts were
attributable to the information released around the alert. 50% (C) to 65% (A and B)
alerts preceded news releases which shows even a larger extent of informed dealing
than the intraday data (note, however, that the sample covers a much longer time
span than the sample of the intraday data). The analysis of news releases conﬁrms
major ﬁndings from the intraday data analysis.
5 Final conclusions
This paper was intended to develop the real-time market abuse detection model,
which would track the market evolution. Although the model structure does not dif-
fer substantially from that of Monteiro, Zaman, Leitterstorf (2007), an attempt to
extend the analysis beyond the closing prices seems, however, to add much value to
the research. The utilization of intraday data is an important step towards the real-
time fraud detection, while separate handling of opening and closing data, motivated
by diﬀerent economic characteristics of that kind of data, is particularly useful in
identifying some kinds of manipulation like marking-the-close. These two approaches
to data appear in some cases to be complementary, as is supported by the empirical
analysis outlined in this paper.
An important innovation to the modeling strategy was to introduce the time-variation
in parameters using Kalman ﬁltering. The study of parameter trajectories indicates
how the assumption of constant parameters may inﬂuence results of market abuse
detection and thus increase the probability of an error. A similar distortion may be
created by unrealistic assumptions on probability distributions, which advocates the
application of the semi-parametric approach when estimating the model as well as
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bootstrapping when identifying abnormal returns.
The contribution of this paper also consists of the generalization of the extended
Kalman ﬁlter outlined in Chou, Engle, Kane (1992) to estimate a time-varying param-
eter model together with a bivariate GARCH eﬀect in disturbances in the observation
equation. A constant conditional correlation parametrization seems to be a plausible
way to model the eﬀect in question, which in the case of zero conditional correla-
tion simpliﬁes to the simultaneous estimation of two univariate GARCH processes.
Additionally, this paper developed some techniques of a more accurate statistical ver-
iﬁcation of state variables’ signiﬁcance and a proper standardization of Kalman ﬁlter
residuals, which are the basis for the identiﬁcation of abnormal returns.
As evidence suggests, the proposed model is quite successful in identifying moments
of potential market abuse activities. Return alerts generated by the model were at-
tributable to subsequent information releases, while autocorrelation alerts coincided
with previously released cases of market manipulation. Such alerts provide an impor-
tant piece of information for the ﬁnancial supervision institutions, which may look
for frauds that otherwise would remain undetected. That is an approach to fraud
detection that is qualitatively diﬀerent from providing kind of ‘statistical proofs’ of
frauds, which have already been under suspicion.
The framework developed in this paper may be with no particular eﬀort applied to
the analysis of real existing stock markets. The model, once estimated, may be up-
dated on a near-continuous basis thanks to the Kalman ﬁlter and may automatically
generate alerts out-of-sample (the frequency of both depends on the time interval
chosen in the model development). The empirical analysis is in favour of such an
approach, especially in the case of open/close data analysis, showing a satisfactory
out-of-sample performance of the estimated model.
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